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SYMPOSIUM 
FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
IN AMERICA AND ABROAD 
FOREWORD 
Jed Handelsman Shugerman* 
 
In the middle of the first panel of the Fordham Law Review symposium, 
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, there was a pivotal, clarifying 
moment.  Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig had been framing modern 
campaign finance as a problem of corruption—systematic and institutional 
corruption.  Richard Hasen rejected that framing, arguing that America’s 
campaign finance system is not truly “corruption” in a legal sense, but rather 
it is fundamentally a problem of inequality.  In the middle of this debate, 
Lessig admitted that he had been making a legal argument about corruption 
pitched to the courts, but that the moral question is different: 
I find it difficult to look at politicians and feel the moral force of the sense 
that they are corrupt.  I find it hard to go to Washington, meet with 
members of Congress, and feel the moral force of, “You are a corrupt 
person.  What you’re doing is against the public interest.”  Because when 
I meet these people and talk to them, they are really decent people.  
They’re people who, in general, think [that] what they are doing is for the 
public good.  Now, they’re wrong about a lot of it, and they are misguided 
because of their obsessive focus on fundraising . . . .  But what I feel [is] 
the moral force here, it is the inequality.1 
 Lessig’s concession of the gap between his legal strategy and his moral 
intuition was why Fordham University School of Law held a live symposium 
and did not just publish of a handful of related papers.  The Fordham 
symposium brought out a spirited, provocative debate about corruption, and 
 
*  Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.  This Foreword provides an 
overview of the symposium entitled Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at 
Fordham University School of Law. 
 
 1. Lawrence Lessig, Remarks at the Fordham University School of Law symposium, 
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad (Mar. 6, 2015).  He then compares the inequality 
of the old White Primary (racially restricted party primaries) to the new Green Primary 
(financially restricted party primaries). Id.  Racial inequality is more reprehensible, but he finds 
both to be a sufficient basis for legal action. Id. 
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Lessig’s reflection struck at one of the deeper problems with combatting 
corruption:  How do we define corruption, and how does that definition relate 
to the real world fight against corruption?  If we demonize corruption in the 
abstract in order to mobilize against it, if our image of corruption is that it is 
evil so that we might rally outrage against it, then what happens when we 
engage with the much more mundane reality of institutional corruption in the 
real world?  We might call this problem the “banality of corruption.”2  What 
happens when good, decent, well-intentioned people are asked to play by 
corrupting rules?  This is precisely what makes our modern campaign finance 
crisis so insidious.  If political corruption were simply a matter of politicians 
getting caught on tape taking briefcases of cash from robber barons dressed 
like Monopoly men with monocles, top hats, and villainous laughs, then we 
wouldn’t have any legal or moral problems cracking down.  And the majority 
of politicians probably would have their own moral qualms about engaging in 
such behavior.  But our banal modern campaign finance system allows well-
intentioned politicians to soothe their consciences, rationalize their behavior, 
and rationalize this system.  This more subtle corruption erodes their ethics 
much more gradually and insidiously. 
This dissonance between the intuitive image of individual corruption—
such as quid pro quo bribery—and the deeper structural problem of 
institutional corruption creates legal challenges.  For example, as a matter of 
doctrine, the First Amendment prevails unless one can show a compelling 
state interest that might trump it.  In order to justify campaign finance 
regulation, reformers follow the precedents and argue that anticorruption is a 
compelling state interest.3  But this high-pitched rhetoric about corruption’s 
evils often fails to match up with the everyday banality of campaign finance 
influence peddling.  Legally, Lessig is correct that the best strategy is to 
portray unregulated campaign spending as corrupt, but our legal imaginations 
often have not adjusted to the bigger picture.  We are struggling with the 
broader focus on campaign finance, and our legal system itself struggles with 
the gray areas.  The Articles for this symposium each confront the problems 
with these gray areas in the battle against both foreign and domestic 
corruption.  To address the reality of corruption, we need a big-picture 
institutional definition, but this symposium’s authors wisely recognize the 
problems and shortcomings of such a broad definition. 
The exchanges at the symposium and these Articles highlight the gap 
between public opinion and legal culture on the definition of corruption and 
the problems that flow from that gap.  Teachout’s and Lessig’s legal 
argument that corruption can be institutional and banal roughly corresponds 
with the public’s moral intuition.  Conversely, Lessig’s and Hasen’s intuitive 
moral reaction—that corruption is the evil of quid pro quo—maps onto the 
 
 2. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM:  A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EVIL 287–88 (1963). 
 3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311–16 (2010); see also NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the 
Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2006). 
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legal conclusion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC4 that 
corruption is narrowly defined as quid pro quo.  Note the reversal of moral 
and legal positions:  Teachout and Lessig’s legal argument tracks the public’s 
moral sensibilities, while Lessig’s moral intuition tracks the Supreme Court’s 
formalism.5  Legal culture certainly values precise line drawing and 
formalism.  Does that formalism also narrow our moral intuitions?  Does it 
make us more tolerant of institutional corruption? 
These questions are one reason why Teachout’s Corruption in America:  
From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United is so important.6  Her 
history demonstrates that the constitutional Framers understood that 
corruption could be institutional, that democratic institutions could erode 
gradually if they were flawed structurally, and that the Framers share this 
understanding with the general public today.7  The lawyers’ formalistic and 
narrow definition of corruption—embraced by today’s Court—is out of step 
not only with modern public opinion, but also with the original understanding 
of the constitutional project. 
This Foreword focuses on a few related observations from the symposium.  
First, it summarizes Teachout’s book, which inspired this symposium and 
which relied on history to undermine Citizens United.  Second, it suggests 
that a more recent case in this Court’s Term, Williams-Yulee vs. Florida Bar,8 
also erodes Citizens United, at least a bit, by recognizing a compelling state 
interest in combating the appearance of corruption and bias in a new context:  
by embracing that corruption lurks in gray areas and the banality of campaign 
fundraising.  Third, Pamela Karlan and Samuel Issacharoff once observed 
that money in politics is like water:  if you stop up one stream, the money 
finds another way to flow.9  I pick up on Albert Alschuler’s critique of 
overbroad criminalization of corruption10 to note how anticorruption reforms 
are also hydraulic systems:  if you dam up one source of reform, you flood 
the other sources.  The result of those dams leads to the unfair damnation of 
public officials who run into zealous prosecutors and a powerful political 
undertow.  If the Court frustrates the ex ante regulation of campaign cash, 
then other actors will step in ex post, and often without the right role or the 
right fit for the structural problems.  The history of campaign finance reform 
demonstrates this pattern of hydraulic forces and unintended consequences. 
 
 4. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5. See generally id. (generally adopting a formalist approach in defining corruption). 
 6. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA:  FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF 
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014). 
 7. Id. at 32–55. 
 8. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2014). 
 9. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1998). 
 10. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption:  Why Broad Definitions of 
Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (2015). 
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I.  TEACHOUT’S CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 
Corruption in America traces the idea of “corruption” over American 
history from the Revolution through the present.11  This is obviously an 
ambitious project, but Teachout succeeds by focusing on legal institutions 
and by writing so engagingly and accessibly.  Teachout argues that 
Americans have a broader, more capacious definition of corruption, rather 
than the narrow definition the Court employs in Citizens United.12  
Corruption historically has included not only bribes and fraud, but also 
situations when public officials “serve private interests at the public’s 
expense.”13  Teachout’s book is a mix of political history, legal challenge to 
Citizens United, and call for reform. 
The book can be divided into four parts, each with four chapters.  The 
first part focuses on the early Republic—how Americans then conceived of 
corruption as the regard for self-interest over public interest and considered 
it to be a national threat.14  Americans contrasted their new republic with a 
European culture of corruption, embodied in the colorful stories of 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and other officials struggling over 
beautiful French gifts.15  In the Constitution, the Framers had prohibited 
such gifts absent congressional approval.  They embraced European notions 
of virtue, civic republicanism, and law, together serving as a bulwark 
against corruption.16  They embraced Montesquieu’s structure of the 
separation of powers as a check against corruption.17  Teachout observes 
that the word “corruption” was used hundreds of times in the convention 
and the ratification debates, but less than 1 percent of those uses were in the 
limited sense of quid pro quo that the Citizens United decision posited.18  
Generally, their use of the word “corruption” reflected a broader meaning of 
private interests and self-interest undermining public spiritedness.  But she 
also shows how the early republic era struggled with how to define and 
correct corruption.19 
The second part of the book turns to the nineteenth century, with 
Americans confronting corruption, but still having trouble defining it as a 
legal matter.20  The most interesting observation in this section is that state 
legislatures initially avoided criminalizing bribery until after the Civil War, 
but at the same time, they resolutely prohibited lobbying as a threat to civic 
republicanism.21  Teachout offers an intriguing interpretation for how 
lobbying reemerged as a legally acceptable activity in the late nineteenth 
 
 11. See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 6. 
 12. See generally id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. See id. at 17–101. 
 15. See id. at 17–31. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 40–44. 
 18. Id. at 50. 
 19. See id. at 81–124. 
 20. See id. at 102–82. 
 21. Id. at 161–65. 
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century:  the lobbyists changed their contracts to emphasize professional 
skills, rather than personal influence; judges’ attitudes toward contracts 
became more laissez-faire, opening the door to a more neutral acceptance of 
lobbying contracts; and as free speech became a more robust legal concept, 
lobbying became associated with the First Amendment.22  This section ends 
with railroads and the transformation of funding for campaign finance—
changing from officeholders paying kickbacks to the party machine, to a 
more familiar world of corporate donations.23 
The corruption of the late nineteenth century triggered a reform campaign 
in the early twentieth century, the topic of the book’s third section.24  
Progressive era reformers adopted bright line rules as prophylactic 
protections against corruption, including the prohibition on corporate 
campaign spending that was eventually overturned in Citizens United.25  In 
the mid-twentieth century, prosecutors creatively applied mail fraud statutes 
to political corruption cases.26  The breadth of the statutes gave wide 
latitude to prosecutors and jurors to define corruption.27  On top of these 
new tools, Watergate led to new anticorruption statutes, but also set the 
stage for Buckley v. Valeo28 and the Court’s equation of money with 
speech.  Teachout critiques Buckley, which struck down Congress’s limits 
on how much candidates can spend,29 with an astute observation:  the Court 
simultaneously has been narrowing its definition of corruption while 
broadening its definition of speech.30 
In the fourth section of the book, which is a contemporary legal and 
policy analysis, Teachout extends this critique by emphasizing a 
constitutional balance of speech and equality values.31  She digs deeper into 
Justice Kennedy’s limited definition of corruption as quid pro quo.32  Her 
research into federal and state precedents shows that this definition was 
exceedingly rare before 1976 and was essentially an invention of the 
Roberts Court.33  She introduces the “anticorruption principle,” which is 
more than simply balancing liberty with equality values;34 it revives the 
civic republicanism and public spiritedness of the Founding era.35  She 
concludes with a call for public financing of elections and a renewed 
commitment to antimonopoly and trust busting.36 
 
 22. Id. at 144–73. 
 23. Id. at 174–82. 
 24. See id. at 183–226. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 29. Id. at 143–44. 
 30. TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 212–13. 
 31. See id. at 227–90. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 238–39. 
 34. Id. at 276. 
 35. See id. at 276–90. 
 36. See id. at 291–305. 
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The book is not an archival history project, but rather a synthesis of 
secondary historical work with some original primary research into the 
Convention, ratification debates, and centuries of precedents.  In order to 
critique Citizens United, Teachout first dug deeply into the Founding era.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United rejected the 
government’s argument that it had a compelling interest in restricting 
independent corporate spending on campaigns.37  Kennedy acknowledged 
that the government had an interest in combating corruption, but he 
essentially limited the definition of corruption to quid pro quo exchanges, 
and he concluded that independent expenditures did not rise to the level of 
corruption.38  Teachout’s first section makes an originalist argument against 
Kennedy’s conclusion by fleshing out the Founding era’s understanding of 
corruption (and the interests which can limit the reach of the First 
Amendment).39  Teachout relies on a series of animated struggles over gifts 
from the French to American ambassadors, including Benjamin Franklin.40  
Both the Articles of Confederation and Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitution restricted the acceptance of foreign gifts.41  Even though gifts 
are not the same as campaign donations, Teachout effectively uses these 
anecdotes to illuminate the Founding generation’s “fixation” with the 
problem of corruption and influence through the exchange of gifts and 
money.42  Teachout offers a rich background from European history, and 
from English and American interpretations of European history, to show 
that the Framers understood how public virtue was vulnerable to corruption 
through self-interest and materialism and how they hoped to protect virtue 
with structural rules.43  She uses English political history and European 
intellectual history to establish this frame of mind circa 1787.44  Teachout 
focuses more on the Framers’ intent, even though more recent theories 
about originalism have focused on “original public meaning,”45 by reading 
popular debates in the press.  Nevertheless, these early chapters on the 
Framers are concise and effective at raising historical objections to Justice 
Kennedy’s definition of corruption. 
Unlike so many originalist projects, Teachout fills in the history between 
then and now with well-chosen episodes and colorful characters.  Her new 
interpretations of those evolutionary steps are novel, significant 
contributions.  Her discussion of the Yazoo land-selling scandal of the 
1790s shows that the Founding generation struggled with how to define 
 
 37. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010); see also TEACHOUT, supra 
note 6, at 32–55. 
 38. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
 39. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 17–80. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI; 
TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 20, 26–27. 
 42. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 28. 
 43. See id. at 30–31. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning (Yale Law Sch., 
Public Law Research Paper No. 551) (book forthcoming 2016). 
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corruption and how to remedy it.46  In Fletcher v. Peck,47 the Marshall 
Court tolerated the selling of land that had originally been the product of 
quid pro quo corruption in the Georgia legislature and even exercised 
judicial review to overturn the following legislature’s effort to address the 
corrupt dealings.48  Thus, even the Founding generation did not 
aggressively rely on corruption as a government interest in trumping 
contract rights and private reliance interests.  The next chapters show how 
antebellum Americans also struggled with providing remedies for 
corruption—more often than not leaving it unremedied and unprosecuted.  
Teachout’s book is accordingly balanced as opposed to one-sided. 
The book is not conceived as a history with new archival sources, as 
legal theory, or as a policy paper.  Its strength is in its powerfully argued 
narrative over the entirety of American history, synthesizing many different 
strands of recent work in legal, political, and intellectual history.  At the 
same time, she offers original legal and historical research at key 
moments.49  Her legal history has powerful relevance to contemporary legal 
debates. 
II.  WILLIAMS-YULEE:  A CRACK IN THE DAM OF CITIZENS UNITED? 
In Citizens United, as discussed above, the Court ruled that the only 
“sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or 
the appearance of corruption” is one that is “limited to quid pro quo 
corruption.”50  Justice Kennedy, writing for a five person majority, 
explained that the government interest in combating appearances of 
corruption was sharply limited: 
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was 
limited to quid pro quo corruption . . . .  The appearance of influence or 
access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our 
democracy . . . .  The fact that speakers may have influence over or access 
to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.51 
In Citizens United, the Court distinguished Caperton v. Massey Coal 
Co.,52 in which a litigant had spent $3 million to defeat an unsympathetic 
judge and elect a more sympathetic judge when his multimillion-dollar case 
was pending.53  In Caperton, there was a legal cost as well as a financial 
cost to such spending:  the victorious judge had a duty to recuse himself 
from the case.  In Citizens United, the Court explained that Caperton 
 
 46. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 81–101. 
 47. 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
 48. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 81–101; see also Peck, 10 U.S. at 133–34. 
 49. See, e.g., TEACHOUT, supra, note 6 (discussing use of the word “corruption” in the 
Founding debates and the use of the phrase quid pro quo in legal precedents over two 
centuries). 
 50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). 
 51. Id. at 359–60. 
 52. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 53. See id. at 869. 
414 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
 
is not to the contrary. . . .  The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s 
due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge . . . .  Caperton’s 
holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the 
litigant’s political speech could be banned.54 
But a case from the most recent Supreme Court Term was indeed to the 
contrary.  In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,55 the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the Florida Supreme Court’s rule prohibiting judicial candidates 
from soliciting money directly.56  Accordingly, the Florida Bar disciplined 
a judicial candidate for mailing and posting online a letter asking for 
campaign funds.57  The Court upheld this ban in a five-to-four decision, 
authored by Chief Justice John Roberts.58  Chief Justice Roberts revived the 
significance of appearances, beyond the Roberts Court’s previous narrow 
focus on quid pro quo bribery.  Roberts explained that the states can curtain 
the First Amendment in order to guard against the appearances of bias, 
influence, and impropriety.59 
In Caperton, Justice Kennedy was the fifth vote for a recusal rule for 
substantial donors who appeared before the judge they supported, while 
Roberts dissented.60  And intriguingly, Justice Kennedy ignored the phrase 
“appearance of bias” and instead crafted a new phrase, “a probability of 
bias.”61  As I have argued before, this switch was a mistake in terms of 
precedent, doctrine, and policy.62  Justice Roberts returned to a traditional 
emphasis on appearances, quoting Justice Frankfurter:  “Justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice.”63  He continued in the same vein later in the 
opinion, writing, “[I]t is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that 
judges who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity that 
prompted the Supreme Court of Florida and most other States to sever the 
direct link between judicial candidates and campaign contributors.”64  
Justice Roberts continued:  “As the Supreme Court of Oregon explained, 
‘the spectacle of lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over money 
to judicial candidates should be avoided if the public is to have faith in the 
impartiality of its judiciary.’”65  From the problem of appearances and 
spectacles of influence, he concluded that Florida was addressing a 
compelling state interest of untoward appearances:  “Here, Florida has 
concluded that all personal solicitations by judicial candidates create a 
public appearance that undermines confidence in the integrity of the 
 
 54. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354–55. 
 55. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 56. See Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2014). 
 57. See id. at 388–89. 
 58. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667–71. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 390 (2009). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See generally Jed H. Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances:  What Caperton v. 
Massey Should Have Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529 (2010). 
 63. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670. 
 64. Id. at 1658. 
 65. Id. at 1672 (citing In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 565 (1990)). 
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judiciary; banning all personal solicitations by judicial candidates is 
narrowly tailored to address that concern.”66  In these passages, Justice 
Roberts adopts the more systemic and institutional approach to the problem 
of corruption.  He refuses to apply the “crabbed” interpretation of 
corruption as limited to quid pro quo or its appearance.67  He focuses on the 
broader problems of influence—“fear [and] favor”—and the general 
dynamics of integrity and public confidence.68  In this case about judges, he 
adopts the Framers’ (and Teachout’s) understanding of public corruption, 
rather than the Citizens United definition. 
Chief Justice Roberts is unmistakably clear that his concern for 
appearances of integrity and independence is limited to the judiciary.  Chief 
Justice Roberts states early in his opinion: 
Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of 
the ballot.  And a State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it 
to treat judicial candidates like campaigners for public office.  A State 
may assure its people that judges will apply the law without fear or 
favor—and without having personally asked anyone for money.69 
The compelling interest is limited to “preserving public confidence in the 
integrity of the judiciary.”70  Justice Scalia mocks the Chief Justice’s 
allegiance to “the Brotherhood of the Robe,” carving out special First 
Amendment rules for judicial candidates because of their unique role.71 
But might a future Court recognize that there is a vital interest in integrity 
for all public offices, or a compelling interest in public confidence that 
legislators and executives are acting fairly and not acting primarily out of 
fear or favor?  The heightened significance of impartiality for judges 
justifies bans on direct solicitations in their races and not for all races.  
Nevertheless, the vital importance of integrity—and the appearance of 
integrity—for all other offices might justify some set of less restrictive 
speech regulations (not rising to the level of banning solicitations, but 
instead upholding limitations on corporate donations and independent 
spending).  Williams-Yulee opens the door to such a debate about a range of 
interests in public confidence in our democratic institutions and, 
accordingly, a broader range of campaign finance regulations.  A future 
justice might agree with Scalia’s critique of Roberts’s “Brotherhood of the 
Robe” and might agree with Scalia that judges are not so fundamentally 
different from other elected officials.72  But instead of Justice Scalia’s 
application of this equivalence—to strike down campaign finance 
restrictions for all judges and all other officials—this future justice might 
 
 66. Id. at 1664. 
 67. See id. at 1660–68. 
 68. Id. at 1660. 
 69. Id. at 1662. 
 70. Id. at 1659–60; see also id. at 1659 (describing the vital interest in Caperton as 
“safeguarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 71. Id. at 1673. 
 72. Id. at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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extend Williams-Yulee’s value of the appearances and public confidence in 
integrity of all offices and would be the fifth vote needed to overturn 
Citizens United. 
III. HYDRAULICS OF MONEY AND REFORM 
Several scholars have compared campaign finance reform to hydraulics.  
Money in politics is like water:  if you build a dam in one place, the water 
will find another way to flow downhill.  In the most famous discussion of 
this metaphor, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, Samuel 
Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan explain: 
Our account, then, is “hydraulic” in two senses.  First, we think political 
money, like water, has to go somewhere.  It never really disappears into 
thin air.  Second, we think political money, like water, is part of a broader 
ecosystem.  Understanding why it flows where it does and what functions 
it serves when it gets there requires thinking about the system as a 
whole.73 
Their point is that reformers have to think big picture about institutions, 
power, and deeper political structures.  “[E]very reform effort to constrain 
political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with 
power to hold onto it.”74  Issacharoff and Karlan offer a few examples 
related to redistricting and gerrymandering,75 but their strongest example is 
the failure of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 to 
reduce the role of big donors.76 
It turns out that campaign finance offers an even more powerful historical 
example of water finding new paths downhill when dams block the old 
path.  For most of the nineteenth century, the structure of American campaign 
finance was a direct and open system of officeholder patronage kickbacks, 
called “assessments.”  Party officials demanded assessments—cash payments 
as a percentage of one’s salary—from public employees who got their jobs 
through party allegiances. 
The original two-party system’s coalitions ran on the spoils system, and 
they “were held together ‘only by the cohesive power of public plunder.’”77  
Party machines got party leaders into office, and then those officers 
rewarded their machines and supporters by appointing them to lucrative 
 
 73. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 9, at 1708. 
 74. Id. at 1705. 
 75. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986). But see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–
1973b-1 (1994); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 648 (1993); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977). See generally 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pamela S. 
Karlan, All Over the Map:  The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 
245 (1993). 
 76. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (1994). 
 77. KURT HOHENSTEIN, COINING CORRUPTION:  THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM 15 (2007) (quoting RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 17 (2000)). 
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government offices.78  The assessment system “became the most important 
financial source for campaign contributions.”79  A Pennsylvania example of 
an assessment form letter demanded:  “Two percent of your salary is ___.  
Please remit promptly.  At the close of the campaign we shall place a list of 
those who have not paid in the hands of the head of the department you are 
in.”80  Many assessments were in the range of 10 to 12 percent of one’s 
salary.81  The federal government expanded enormously during and after 
the Civil War,82 and the assessments on federal officeholders “provided the 
main and steadiest source of campaign contributions.”83  However, the 
growth of the size of government during the Civil War and Reconstruction 
also drew more attention to the size of budgets and the growth of taxes.  
These changes drew more public attention and more public criticism of 
waste and corruption.84 
Reformers passed three major statutes prohibiting assessments85:  the 
Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, the 1876 Anti-Assessment Act, and the 
Pendleton Act of 1883, which created the federal government’s first major 
civil service reforms.86  From 1876 to 1883, political assessments “declined 
precipitously.”87  The Anti-Assessment legislation led to a “sea change in 
the manner in which political parties would raise and spend campaign 
funds.”88  Public opinion had demanded budget cutting, and congressmen 
saw easy cuts in government salaries.  If federal officials were only taking 
home 80 to 90 percent of their salary due to assessments, then they knew 
they could abolish assessments, cut salaries by 10 to 20 percent, and the 
officials would be left with the same take-home pay.89  But reform is slow 
and easily evaded:  the Anti-Assessment Act was not enforced for six 
years.90  Then the assassination of President James A. Garfield in 1881 by a 
spurned office seeker shocked the nation, focused attention on the 
patronage/corruption problem, and changed public opinion.  Newly elected 
President Chester A. Arthur suddenly changed his policy from pro-
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patronage to pro-reform, and the Republicans in Congress worked with the 
reform wing of the Democratic Party to pass the Pendleton Act.91  The 
Pendleton Act is known primarily for establishing the first major civil 
service reforms, but its most powerful change at the time was cracking 
down even more firmly on political assessments.92  “The post-Pendleton 
weaning of the parties from assessment-sourced funding, coupled with the 
growth and rising influence of national corporations within the political 
system, by 1896 reshaped the structure of campaign financing that would 
remain essentially unchanged until 1971.”93 
These events “caused both political leaders and American businessmen to 
reexamine their role in national campaign finance issues.”94  As 
assessments disappeared, the costs of elections were simultaneously 
accelerating in the 1880s and 1890s.  Corporate spending replaced the 
assessments and led to the modern campaign finance system.95  The decline 
on assessments coincided with sudden increase in corporate power.  The 
industry took advantage of the changes to dominate party politics.  Both 
Democrats and Republicans depended on corporate spending, and 
legislators developed strategies to target businesses for donations.96  The 
“squeeze bill” or “frying the fat” was a way for legislators to hold 
corporations’ feet to the fire and fry the fat out of them with threats of 
hostile legislation.97  Party bosses bargained to ditch the bills only once the 
targeted businesses donated money.98  But as businesses paid more and 
more money to parties, they gained the upper hand in being able to control 
the parties. 
Crony patronage transformed into crony capitalism.  The 1884 election 
was significant in how both parties’ presidential candidates pursued the 
support of big business and the robber barons.99  In 1888, Republicans had 
an advantage in corporate donations, but the Democrats competed 
evenly.100  The 1896 election was the peak of corporate involvement; it is 
an election that stands out as the most expensive election in American 
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history (and by far the most expensive as a matter of per capita spending or 
as a percentage of gross domestic product).101  Political financier Mark 
Hanna raised $3.5 million for William McKinley, and McKinley’s total was 
almost $7 million, compared to the mere few hundred thousand raised for 
William Jennings Bryan.102  Ever since the elections of the 1880s and 
1890s, large donations from special interests have been the foundation of 
the American campaign finance system.  One scholar observed that the 
campaign finance system underwent one of its most significant changes in 
the 1880s and 1890s and then once again in the Watergate era of the mid-
1970s.103 
The Articles in this symposium reflect this same problem of hydraulics.  
Again, once you stop money at one source, it finds another way to flow into 
the political system.  Richard Hasen takes up Teachout’s claim that campaign 
contributions start a slippery moral slope toward bribery and cause criminal 
corruption.  Hasen critiques this link, noting that there are relatively few 
corruption cases in Congress and that there seems to be no correlation 
between the level of caps on individual donations and the amount of 
corruption.  Instead, Hasen suggests that the rate of corruption is correlated to 
the distance of the state capital from the state’s media center.  Hasen’s 
explanation is that when a state capital is more distant from the state’s major 
city and media center, this remoteness gives politicians more of a sense of 
being insulated from scrutiny, which leads them to engage in more and more 
corruption.  If this dynamic is true, it is a great example of reform efforts 
backfiring.  For the national capital, the Founders chose not Philadelphia, 
New York, or Boston, but instead, they chose a swamp resting between 
Maryland and Virginia.  The chief explanation for this placement in the South 
was that the first Congress needed to coax the South into a compromise on 
state debts.  But the early Republic’s leaders also wanted the capital to be 
independent from any one state, and they wanted the capital to be insulated 
from the influence of major commercial centers.  This compromise in 1790, 
with the goal of appeasing Southern politicians, placed the capital far from 
the Northern centers of commerce and outside Southern cities, too—a 
swampy blank slate free of preexisting influences.  Note, too, how so many 
states chose capitals far away from the state’s commercial, financial, and 
cultural centers.  This is one reason why memorizing state capitals was such a 
challenge in elementary school.  Many state capitals were purposely obscure:  
Albany, rather than New York; Harrisburg, rather than Philadelphia; 
Columbia, rather than Charleston; Hartford, rather than New Haven; 
Annapolis, rather than Baltimore; Baton Rouge, rather than New Orleans; 
Sacramento, rather than San Francisco or Los Angeles; et cetera.  If the 
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leaders in these states hoped that distant commercial powers would insulate 
officials from corruption, then Hasen’s findings may suggest that the 
insulation backfired:  distance created a feeling of protection from media 
scrutiny and promoted a culture of corruption. 
Hasen’s Article relies on a study by Harry Enten on patterns of corruption 
in the states.104  Enten’s research also points to another mismatch between 
legal reform and the reality of corruption105:  states with the strictest ethics 
laws often have the highest number of official corruption cases.  Why?  The 
causal arrows are reversed:  ethics laws do not decrease a culture of 
corruption; rather, a culture of corruption triggers a response of enacting more 
ethics laws, which do not actually change the culture.  The money still flows 
despite reform. 
Another example of anticorruption efforts backfiring appears in Jay 
Holtmeier’s Article on cross-border corruption enforcement.  When one 
nation has clear and predictable anticorruption laws, many corporations will 
self-report violations in order to offer up cases involving corrupt individuals 
and to avoid larger punishments for the entire corporation.  One might think 
that multiple nations cracking down on corruption would increase 
compliance; on the contrary, the gaps between different nations’ legal 
definitions of corruption and the lack of predictability have a chilling effect 
on self-reporting.  Other Articles in this symposium reflect a different kind of 
hydraulics:  corruption as market competition106 and as supply and 
demand.107 
Perhaps the most troubling example of the hydraulics of campaign finance 
is in Albert Alschuler’s Article.  Alschuler argues that criminal prosecution is 
a deeply flawed way of cracking down on political corruption.  The 
definitions of corruption have become too broad, leading to a lack of fairness 
across cases, with too much prosecutorial discretion, whim, and partisan 
abuse.  I suggest that this is another example of hydraulics:  demand for 
reform is also like water.  As the Court dams up structural reform of the 
campaign finance system, the demand for anticorruption flows to other parts 
of the government.  The legislature responds to public frustration, but when 
those efforts at structural reform are overturned, the next solution is 
piecemeal, case-by-case targeting of reform, i.e., criminal charges.  
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Prosecutors—some well-intentioned hydraulic engineers, others exploiting 
the political situation—overzealously pursue criminal charges.  Alschuler 
rightly notes that prosecution is not a fair or effective way to remedy the deep 
and muddy problems of influence and special interests in American politics.   
United States Attorney Preet Bharara’s keynote address focused on 
prosecution as the remedy for corruption, which is too narrow a view of the 
systemic problem.108  Like the Roberts Court and the legal formalists, he 
portrays the problem of corruption in terms of the “bad folks,” who commit 
fraud, bribe, and break the law, and the good folks, who sometimes fail to 
report this criminal behavior.109  Considering Bharara’s position as U.S. 
Attorney, his viewpoint is understandable.  But we must keep in mind that 
corruption does not address the “good folks” who play by the rules, though 
those rules lead to systemic corruption. 
And this brings us back to Larry Lessig’s moral qualms.  Prosecution is for 
the truly morally corrupt individuals, for the quid pro quo.  For the structural 
problem of fear and favor, of institutional corruption by design, the solution is 
structural change.  But when the Court puts dams in front of structural 
change, we are left with the powerful hydraulic waves finding other channels 
for reform.  We get stuck thinking that corruption is a matter of evil and 
criminal law. And the courts’ legal dams in constitutional law create 
unintended consequences of injustice, the unfair damnation of public officials 
as criminal defendants.  Until we transform our understanding of corruption 
from an effort to condemn individuals to an effort to fix with broader 
institutional reform, we will be out of touch with the Framers’ eighteenth-
century vision of democracy, and we will be out of luck in the twenty-first 
century as well. 
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